Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area Criteria: Lessons for the Central and Eastern European Countries by Roman Horvath
WORKING PAPER SERIES 8
Roman Horváth:
Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area Criteria: Implications for the
Central and Eastern European Countries 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area 





























 CNB WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
The Working Paper Series of the Czech National Bank (CNB) is intended to disseminate the 
results of the CNB’s research projects as well as the other research activities of both the staff 
of the CNB and collaborating outside contributors. The Series aims to present original 
research contributions relevant to central banks. It is refereed internationally. The referee 
process is managed by the CNB Research Department. The working papers are circulated to 
stimulate discussion. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the official views of the CNB. 
 



























Reviewed by:  Dana Hájková    (Czech National Bank) 
  Jarko Fidrmuc  (OeNB)  
  Fabrizio Coricelli   (University of Siena)  
 
Project Coordinator:  Martin Cincibuch  
 
© Czech National Bank, December 2005 
Roman Horváth  Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area 
















This paper estimates the medium-term determinants of the bilateral exchange rate variability 
and exchange rate pressures for 20 developed countries in the 1990s. The results suggest that 
the optimum currency area criteria explain the dynamics of bilateral exchange rate variability 
and pressures to a large extent. Next, we predict exchange rate volatility and pressures for the 
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). We find that the CEECs encounter 
exchange rate pressures at approximately the same level as the euro area countries did before 
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Nontechnical Summary 
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of bilateral exchange rate volatility and pressures for 20 
developed countries. We employ standard optimum currency area (OCA) criteria such as trade 
linkages and business cycle synchronization to address the issue. Specifically, we examine the 
hypothesis of whether countries fulfilling the OCA criteria to a lesser degree encounter greater 
exchange rate variability and pressures. In other words, countries experiencing similar shocks 
should have stable exchange rates. 
We start by estimating whether exchange rate volatility is explicable by the set of optimum 
currency area criteria. Next, similarly we study whether the OCA conditions rank among the 
culprits of exchange rate pressures. This is so, as policy makers may regard excessive exchange 
rate volatility as undesirable for the economy and thus attempt to limit the variation of the 
exchange rate. Nevertheless, this strategy might not be successful in limiting the pressures on the 
foreign exchange market.  
We find that the variables indicated by the optimum currency area theory explain the dynamics of 
exchange rates and exchange rate pressures to a large extent. There is also some evidence that 
more open and less financially developed economies fear letting their exchange rates float freely 
(fear of floating). Greater variability of the US dollar increases exchange rate variability, but not 
exchange rate pressures. The results also do not support any significant difference between the EU 
core and EU periphery. European economies bilaterally face both weaker exchange rate 
variability and weaker exchange rate pressures as compared to other developed countries.  
Next, we also predict exchange rate variability and pressures for the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs). The results suggest some heterogeneity among the CEECs in terms of their 
exchange rate volatility and pressures. Notably, Estonia has experienced both low variability and 
low pressures. Overall, our model implies that the current levels of exchange rate variability and 
pressures are at the same level as the euro area countries before they adopted the euro. This is 
because the CEECs seem to be relatively well aligned with the euro area countries, especially in 
terms of their trade integration, openness and similar export commodity structure. 
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1. Introduction 
There are numerous papers that deal with the first moment of the exchange rate, i.e., that focus on 
finding the equilibrium exchange rate. In this paper we take a different approach that concentrates 
on the second moment of the exchange rate, i.e., that attempts to identify the determinants of 
exchange rate variability, using a quarterly data set for 20 developed economies over the period 
1989–1998. In this respect, we employ standard optimum currency area (OCA) criteria such as 
trade linkages and business cycle synchronization to address the issue.
1 Specifically, we examine 
the hypothesis of whether countries fulfilling the OCA criteria to a lesser degree encounter greater 
exchange rate variability. In other words, countries experiencing similar shocks should have stable 
exchange rates. In addition, factors other than the standard set of OCA criteria, such as financial 
development or inflation differentials, may matter as well, and we make use of these, too.  
In this regard, policy makers may regard excessive exchange rate volatility as undesirable for the 
economy and thus attempt to limit the variation of the exchange rate. Nevertheless, this strategy 
might not be successful in limiting the pressures on the foreign exchange market. Therefore, we 
investigate whether the OCA conditions rank among the culprits of exchange rate pressures.  
The methodology applied in this paper originates in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) (hereinafter 
“BE”)
2, but we elaborate on a series of issues, especially in the estimation of the extent of 
exchange rate pressures, the inclusion of additional relevant factors and the evaluation of the 
relevance of instrumental variables.
3 Therefore, our approach also allows us to assess the 
robustness of the findings of BE.  
In addition, we provide simple “out-of-sample approach” forecasting, in the spirit of the real 
equilibrium exchange rate literature (see e.g. Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997, or Maeso-Fernandez et 
al., 2004), to predict exchange rate volatility and pressures for several Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) based on the OCA criteria. This allows us to identify the part of 
exchange rate volatility and exchange rate pressures explicitly connected with fundamentals (or 
the OCA criteria in our case). Obviously, if the volatility and pressures were to remain high and 
persist in the future (whatever the difficulty with finding the right benchmark for comparison), it 
would indicate that euro adoption may not be beneficial for these countries. On the other hand, 
favorable OCA conditions imply, for small open economies, that the necessary condition for 
joining the monetary union is met (sustainability of the union in the long run) and policy makers 
may choose the timing and scenario of euro adoption that maximizes the medium-term net 
benefits for the economy. 
The paper is organized as follows: We discuss some basics on OCAs and the fear of floating in 
section II. The empirical methodology is laid out in section III. We provide an instrumental 
variable estimation of bilateral exchange rate variability and exchange rate pressures in section 
IV. The application to the CEECs is presented in section V. Section VI concludes. An appendix 
with some descriptive statistics follows.  
                                                           
1 See Mongelli (2002) for a recent survey of the OCA literature.  
2 Devereux and Lane (2003) also apply this methodology to examine the external sustainability of developing 
countries. 
3 In addition, BE apply their methodology to data from the 1980s, while we work with data from the 1990s. 4   Roman Horváth  
 
2. Optimum Currency Areas and Fear of Floating 
Traditionally, optimum currency area theory focuses on the choice of the optimal exchange rate 
regime and discusses the conditions that countries should fulfill in order to maximize the benefits 
stemming from a common currency (Mundell, 1961). Theoretically, the usefulness of a country 
having its own currency decreases when countries are subject to common shocks. To begin with, 
the OCA theory puts forward a number of criteria under which it is more likely that idiosyncratic 
shocks will occur rarely. Next, the OCA theory emphasizes that in the event of idiosyncratic 
shocks nonetheless occurring after the formation of the currency union, the union is likely to be 
more sustainable if the economy reacts to such shocks with low welfare loss. On the other hand, 
Mundell (1973) notes that even countries subject to idiosyncratic shocks may form a currency 
union if they are able to diversify the risks sufficiently. This, however, requires well-functioning 
and integrated financial markets.  
Recently, there have been additional advances in the literature on the optimal exchange rate 
choice. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) point out that countries will have a tendency to limit the 
fluctuations of their exchange rate due to financial imperfections. Typically, if a country is highly 
indebted and cannot borrow in its own currency, exchange rate fluctuations expose it to currency 
and interest rate mismatches. Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2002) discuss the reasons behind the 
fear of floating in greater detail. Often, researchers associate the fear of floating with the 
developing economies. However, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) present evidence that even some of 
the developed countries fear floating.  
The OCA theory and fear of floating literature emphasize different factors for the exchange rate 
regime choice. Traditional OCA theory focuses much more on the real sector, while the fear of 
floating literature stresses only the financial aspects of the regime choice. While our primary 
focus is on the OCA criteria, we also study financial development as one of the factors behind the 
choice of exchange rate regime. 
In this paper, we approximate the usefulness of a country having its own currency using exchange 
rate variability or pressures. Our supposition is that substantial exchange rate volatility or high 
exchange rate pressures indicate that the nominal exchange rate remains an important adjustment 
mechanism. Next, trade integration and synchronization of business cycles stand as a proxy for 
the extent of idiosyncratic shocks at the national level. As such, we expect that greater trade 
integration and more synchronized business cycles will be associated with greater exchange rate 
stability. Analogously, dissimilarity of export commodity structure might be a useful proxy for 
capturing the extent of idiosyncratic shocks at the sectoral level. Both the OCA and fear of 
floating literature imply that a more open country will tend to limit its exchange rate volatility. In 
a similar manner, the utility from a country maintaining its own currency decreases when the 
economic size of that country is small.  
Next, we control for several factors to assess the robustness of the set of standard OCA criteria in 
explaining exchange rate volatility and pressures. First, financially developed countries are likely 
to exhibit stable exchange rates, as their FX markets are more liquid. Second, greater inflation 
differentials are likely to be associated with less stable exchange rates (on a bilateral basis). 
Finally, we introduce two dummies capturing the potential difference in terms of exchange rate 
volatility and pressures between EU core vs. EU periphery countries and European vs. non-Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area Criteria   5 
 
European countries. It is sometimes disputed whether the economic structure of the EU core 
countries (such as Austria or Germany) is substantially more similar in comparison with the 
remaining EU countries (Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2003).  
3. Empirical Methodology 
A growing body of literature (see e.g. Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, or von Hagen and Zhou, 2005) 
suggests that it may not be appropriate to study de iure exchange rate regimes, as de facto regimes 
may actually be different. We follow this line and apply a methodology that fully accounts for two 
crucial issues identified in the literature. It models the actual exchange rate regimes as well as the 
multiple interdependencies among economies.  
In this regard, we examine the variables influencing bilateral exchange rate variability in 20 
industrial countries in the period 1989–1998. Later in the text, we refer for convenience to the 
period 1989–1998 as the 1990s. The countries in the sample are as follows: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA.
4 As our 
setting is bilateral, the combination of 20 countries leads to 190 observations. 
 
We estimate the following equation: 
 
            ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij e INFL EUcore DOLVAR EUROPE FIN X VOL + + + + + + + = γ ϕ φ δ χ β α    (1)  
 
The dependent variable in equation (1) stands for the bilateral exchange rate variability.5 Xij is a 
vector of OCA variables (focused on both the probability of an asymmetric shock and the ability 
to withstand the shock), specifically asymmetry of business cycles, trade linkages, dissimilarity of 
export commodity structure, openness and economic size, all between country i and country j. 
FINij captures the level of financial development and EUROPEij is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if countries i and j are both European. DOLVARij captures the variability of the U.S. 
dollar. The EUcoreij dummy assesses the hypothesis of significantly higher real convergence 
among the following countries: Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
INFLij represents the inflation rate differential.
6  
 
                                                           
4 We exclude Greece due to a lack of data.  
5 Weimann (2003) argues that the BE methodology may entail some econometric difficulties. He claims that 
there are censored as well as uncensored dependent variables. Nominal exchange rates are bounded by the 
fluctuation margins in the ERM, but are free elsewhere. This is right in a bilateral target zone, but, in fact, need 
not be the case in a multilateral target zone. Indeed, Serrat (2000) shows that the exchange rate volatility in 
multilateral target zones may increase under some conditions, as compared to a free float. 
6 We obtained the data underlying the variables VOLij, DOLVARij and FINij from  the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). BCSij, SIZEij and OPENij were computed from the World Bank databases. TRADEij 
was calculated using the IMF Directions of Trade and World Bank databases, and variable DISSIMij was sourced 
from the OECD’s Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade. 6   Roman Horváth  
 
We measure bilateral exchange rate variability as 
 
                                          ( ) [ ] ij ij e SD VOL log ∆ =                                             (2) 
 
where STDEV[∆(log eij)] is the standard deviation of the change (∆) from quarter t to quarter t+1 
in the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate (eij) between countries i and j.
7 The formal 
derivation of all the explanatory variables is presented in Appendix 1.  
Next, we estimate the equation with exchange rate pressures as the dependent variable, 
analogously to that of variability. To do this, we first construct the proxy for the extent of 
intervention as 








− = ,                                   (3) 
where ∆(Resi) is the quarterly change in reserves in country i and M0i is a measure of narrow 
money (both obtained from the IMF’s IFS dataset). We are aware that the correlation between FX 
intervention volume and change in reserves need not be close to unity.
8 Nevertheless, the change 
in reserves is the closest proxy available for actual FX intervention volumes. 
To construct the estimate of exchange rate pressures, we adjust the bilateral exchange rate 
variability for the effect of interventions and the interest rate differential in countries i and j:  
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ij j i ij ij r on Interventi on Interventi e SD essure ∆ + − + ∆ = µ η λ ) log( Pr ,                  (4) 
 
where  ∆rij  represents the difference between short-term interest rates between country i and 
country j (data obtained from the IMF’s IFS). Parametersλ , η  and µ  are determined as the 
inverse of the variance of each variable over the sample period and alternatively by the principal 
components method (thus giving a greater weight to series with greater volatility), as opposed to 
the original BE methodology, which simply assumed λ  = η  = µ  = 1. This choice is motivated to 
provide a sensitivity analysis for the measurement of exchange rate pressures.  
We estimate each cross-sectional equation by the generalized method of moments (GMM), as the 
results of the Hausmann-Wu test indicate that some of the explanatory variables are endogenous. 
In addition, it is worth noting that even if the instruments are “exogenous”, they may be weak. 
Consequently, this would increase the asymptotic standard errors and reduce the power of the 
hypothesis tests. Therefore, we examine the presence of weak instruments by Shea’s test, which is 
                                                           
7 The results are largely the same if we use monthly changes. 
8 Neely (2000) provides some evidence for several developed countries. It is interesting to note that the 
correlation of quarterly FX intervention volumes and the change in reserves stands at 0.72 for the Czech 
Republic in 1999–2004 (we were unable to obtain the analogous data for the other countries in our sample). Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area Criteria   7 
 
particularly appropriate when there are multiple endogenous regressors.
9 For the sake of space, we 
omit the ordinary least squares (OLS) results. Besides, the OLS results are inconsistent. 
4. Results – Instrumental Variable Estimation 
In this section, we provide an instrumental variable estimation of the determinants of the 
variability of bilateral exchange rate changes and the variability of exchange rate pressures.  
The Hausman-Wu test indicates that five variables (BCSij, TRADEij, DOLVARij, INFLij and 
OPENij) are endogenous. As a result, we instrument these variables. We downloaded these 
instruments from Andy Rose’s website: www.haas.berkeley.edu/~arose. The set of 
instruments is as follows: log (distance) and its square, regional trade agreement dummy, 
common language dummy, common border dummy, size of economies, USA dummy and 
exogenous variables.
10 Additionally, we provide detailed descriptive statistics on all the 
variables, including the instruments, in Table 8-12 in the Appendix. 
First, we estimate the Shea’s partial R-squared. Shea’s partial R-squared is a measure of the 
relevance of instrumental variables in the case of multiple endogenous variables. Thus, it can 
pinpoint the possible presence of weak instruments if the partial R-squared is sufficiently small. In 
this case, we generally find poor instruments for the variability of output and inflation (see also 
Table 9 for the relevant correlation matrix). We calculate Shea’s statistic based on a number of 
different specifications to assess the robustness of the results. The partial R-squared for the 
variability of output and inflation is relatively small and ranges from 0.1 to 0.2. The R-squared for 
the remaining endogenous variables is much higher. Generally, it takes values between 0.4 and 
0.8 (with an average of 0.4 for openness, 0.6 for trade links and 0.8 for the variability of the 
dollar). Detailed results are available in Table 13 in the Appendix. Finally, we decide to exclude 
the variability of output and the inflation differential from the estimation, as their inclusion causes 
most of the explanatory variables to be insignificant, while this is not true in the OLS estimation. 
In this context, this clearly shows the importance of assessing the relevance of instruments. 
Table 1 gives the results for the determinants of bilateral exchange rate variability. We report the 
results for four different equations together to give some insights into the sensitivity of the 
estimates. The first two columns present the results with respect to the “traditional” OCA criteria 





                                                           
9 We only use Shea’s measure of relevance of instruments, although this test lacks a distributional theory. All 
other tests rely on assumptions not satisfied in this paper. Hahn and Hausman (2002) provide the test for only 
one or two endogenous regressors, and we identified five endogenous regressors. However, the test by Stock and 
Yogo (2004) assumes homoskedastic disturbances, which is also not the case in this paper. 
10 The use of the central bank independence index as an additional potential instrument is left for further 
research.  8   Roman Horváth  
 
Table 1: Variability of Actual Exchange Rates, IV Estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Trade linkages  -0.027 -0.031 -0.023 -0.023 
  (-2.39)** (-2.31)**  (-5.13)*** (-5.57)*** 
Dissimilarity of exports  0.037 0.054 0.001 0.001 
  (2.62)*** (2.97)***  (1.73)* (1.66)* 
Size of economy   0.006  0.001  
   (4.19)***  (2.41)**  
Openness   -0.296    -0.085 
  (-5.47)***    (-2.88)*** 
Financial development  -0.222 -0.260 0.020 -0.035 
  (-2.24)** (-2.05)**  (-1.30) (-2.87)*** 
Variability of dollar     0.040 0.038 
     (3.53)*** (3.32)*** 
EU core dummy     -0.001 0.0003 
     (-0.36) (-0.13) 
Europe dummy     -0.015 -0.015 
     (-14.45)*** (-14.8)*** 
      
Sargan test   5.66 3.49 8.78 6.75 
p-value  0.34 0.48 0.07 0.15 
Note: t-statistic based on robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. P-value is reported for Sargan 
test. Openness coefficients multiplied by 1,000. Financial development coefficient multiplied by 
10
8. *, **, *** - denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
Generally, the explanatory variables are typically significant with the expected signs in all the 
specifications. Moreover, the value of the coefficients is stable across the specifications to a large 
extent. Greater trade linkages robustly decrease bilateral exchange rate variability, while 
dissimilarity in the commodity structure of bilateral exports tends to increase it. This dissimilarity 
reflects industry-specific shocks. These shocks are more similar if countries display a comparative 
advantage in the same export industries. Greater openness is associated with smaller exchange 
rate variability, as is financial deepening. The relationship between openness and exchange rate 
fluctuations may suggest that more open economies fear floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
Understandably, USD fluctuations spread to volatility of other currencies. Exchange rate volatility 
is substantially lower in European countries, reflecting the existence of the ERM. The EU core 
countries dummy is not positively associated with exchange rate variability, which is in line with 
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003), who also find no significant difference between EU core and 
periphery countries in this respect.
11  
As mentioned above, there are reasons for examining the determinants of exchange rate pressures 
as well. The authorities may limit exchange rate volatility if they believe that it undermines the 
country’s stability and growth prospects. Nevertheless, they may hardly limit the exchange rate 
pressures that arise if the current exchange rate is not optimal.  
The results for exchange rate pressures, as depicted in Table 2, show a similar and consistent 
pattern. Contrary to the results of BE, trade links are important in limiting the pressures. Industry-
                                                           
11 The results with the ERM participation dummy are largely similar to those with the Europe dummy and, for 
the sake of brevity, are not presented.  Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area Criteria   9 
 
specific shocks do not seem to affect the pressures. This may be because policy makers typically 
do not react to industry-specific shocks. Openness is negatively associated with pressures. It 
seems that more open countries are affected by large exchange rate pressures to a greater extent. 
In contrast to the results in Table 1, financial development is positively associated with exchange 
rate pressures. A likely explanation put forward by Devereux and Lane (2003) is that financially 
more developed countries are able to tolerate greater exchange rate pressures. Interestingly, 
variability of the dollar does not influence the extent of pressures. On the other hand, the Europe 
dummy is significant with a negative sign, suggesting that lower pressures were prevailing among 
these countries on a bilateral basis. The EU core dummy is not robustly associated with pressures 
either. 
Table 2: Variability of Exchange Rate Pressures, IV Estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Trade linkages  -11.11 -8.49  -8.22  -6.50  -4.88 -3.73 -3.47 -2.74 
  (-6.10)*** (-4.57)*** (-3.99)*** (-4.54)*** (6.22)*** (4.62)*** (-4.10)***  (-4.67)*** 
Dissimilarity of exports  -0.32 -0.217 0.06  0.25  0.12 -0.06 0.03 0.12 
  (-0.51)  (-0.34)  (0.11) (0.6) (0.45)  (-0.22)  (0.17)  (0.70) 
Size of economy  1.14  0.61  0.52  0.26  
  (6.26)***   (1.83)*   (6.76)***   (1.94)*   
Openness    -0.062   -0.02  -0.03  -0.01 
   (-6.48)***   (-1.65)*   (-6.90)***   (-1.69)* 
Financial development  83.1 59.8 56.9 37.2 35.6 24.8 23.0 14.5 
  (4.86)*** (4.24)*** (2.68)*** (3.05)*** (4.89)*** (4.12)*** (2.64)*** (2.91)*** 
Variability of dollar     -3.12  -3.79     -0.61  -0.87 
     (-0.63)  (-0.86)     (-0.30)  (-0.49) 
EU core dummy     -1.26  -0.93     -0.52  -0.37 
     (-1.68)*  (-1.15)     (-1.64)  (-1.09) 
Europe dummy     -1.19  -1.64     -0.60  -0.79 
     (-1.87)*  (-3.63)***     (-2.31)**  (-4.24)*** 
          
Sargan test   2.94 2.79 4.37 6.27 2.43 2.37 4.18 5.93 
p-value  0.56 0.59 0.36 0.18 0.66 0.67 0.38 0.20 
Note: t-statistic based on robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. P-value is reported for Sargan 
test. Openness coefficients multiplied by 1,000. Financial development coefficient multiplied by 
10
8. *, **, *** - denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. In columns (1)–(4) 
the dependent variable is calculated as stated in equation (4), while in columns (5)–(8) it is 
calculated by the principal component method.  
 
Overall, the variables indicated by the OCA theory provide a sufficient role for the determination 
of bilateral exchange rate variability and pressures in the 1990s. This largely supports the previous 
findings of BE for the 1960s–1980s. Nevertheless, our approach seems to generate more robust 
results in terms of the sign and size of the estimated parameters. In addition, the robustness of the 
results allows us, in our opinion, to apply it to the Central and Eastern European countries. 10   Roman Horváth  
 
5. Implications for Central and Eastern European Countries 
In this section we provide an application to the CEECs and predict their exchange rate volatility 
and pressures based on the OCA criteria. As argued below, the motivation for carrying out such 
analysis is to assess the degree of alignment of the CEECs with the Eurozone. We predict the 
exchange rate volatility and pressures using what is called the “out-of-sample approach” in the 
equilibrium exchange rate literature (see Halpern and Wyplosz, 1997, or Maeso-Fernandez et al., 
2004). This approach is based on a two-step procedure. In the first step, the relationship between 
exchange rate volatility (or pressures) and fundamentals is estimated for the developed countries 
(as done in section III). In the second step, we calculate the predicted exchange rate variability 
and pressures for the CEECs on the basis of the estimated structural relationship from step one.  
As a result, we obtain a prediction of medium-term exchange rate volatility and pressures for the 
CEECs adjusted for exchange rate volatility based on the OCA criteria. We interpret this result as 
a measure of the readiness for euro adoption. This is in line with Vaubel (1976), who argues that 
countries fulfilling the OCA criteria should largely have stable real exchange rates.
12 On the other 
hand, if a country’s OCA conditions imply substantial variation in exchange rates (or exchange 
rate pressures, if the country fixes its exchange rate), then the adoption of a common currency 
may not be a good choice.  
It is worth noting that our approach is a rather conservative estimate of readiness to adopt the 
euro, for two reasons. First, the OCA criteria may be endogenous (Frankel and Rose, 1998). 
Frankel and Rose argue that a common currency spurs trade integration and, as a result, also 
synchronization of business cycles. In other words, the post-accession shock patterns may differ 
from the pre-accession ones as a result of the adoption of the common currency. On the other 
hand, the “OCA endogeneity” effect may be quite small for the highly open CEECs, whose trade 
is already largely oriented to the Eurozone. Second, the exchange rate itself may generate rather 
than absorb shocks. Borghuis and Kuijs (2004) find for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia that the exchange rate has served “as much or more as an unhelpful 
propagator of monetary and financial shocks than as a useful absorber of real shocks”. In such 
case, the net benefits of a country maintaining its own currency decrease. 
 The list of CEECs in this paper is as follows: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Romania. To examine the 
aforementioned hypothesis, we first compute the descriptive statistics of the selected OCA 
criteria, exchange rate variability and pressures for these countries. Second, we predict the 
exchange rate volatility and pressures based on the OCA criteria vis-à-vis the euro area and 
compare the results with the corresponding actual values.
13 In this regard, we use the quarterly 
data from 1999:1 to 2004:4, as we believe that the data prior this period are only partially 
informative with regard to euro adoption.  
                                                           
12 Horváth and Kučerová (2005) find that the OCA criteria also largely explain the real exchange rate variability. 
13 The data in this section were obtained from the IMF’s online IFS, the EIU, the OECD’s Monthly Statistics of 
Foreign Trade and, exceptionally, various central bank websites. Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area Criteria   11 
 
Table 3: OCA Conditions in the CEECs, 1999–2004 
  Trade links  Dissimilarity 
of exports  Openness  Financial 
Development 
Bulgaria 0.105  0.287  114.1  1.53 
Czech Republic  0.223 0.053 129.9 2.69 
Estonia 0.237  0.106  163.1  1.42 
Hungary 0.224  0.084  137.2  1.75 
Latvia 0.099  0.617  94.4  1.19 
Lithuania 0.121  0.317  103.4  1.00 
Poland 0.087  0.093  64.9  1.62 
Romania 0.112  0.147  76.0  0.87 
Slovakia 0.256  0.085  147.7  2.44 
Slovenia   0.160  0.023  114.1  1.96 
Eurozone 0.177  0.314  70.3  2.71 
Eurozone – GDP weighted  0.246  0.259  67.8  3.72 
Note: See section III – Empirical Methodology for an explanation of how the variables have been 
calculated. The data are from 1999–2004 for the CEECs. The OCA conditions for the CEECs 
are calculated with the EMU. In the last two rows, the Eurozone values are the averages, or 
GDP-weighted averages, of all its current members’ OCA conditions in 1989–1998. The CEEC 
trade intensity results are based on the EU.  
 
First, we examine the OCA conditions in the CEECs. Specifically, we focus on trade links, 
dissimilarity of export commodity structure, openness and financial development.
14 Table 3 
depicts the OCA conditions for the CEECs averaged from 1999 to 2004 (based on quarterly 
data).
15  
We find that trade integration in the CEECs vis-à-vis the euro area is topped by the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia. At the bottom are Bulgaria, Latvia and Poland. 
Nevertheless, trade integration is generally very high, reaching levels typical for the Eurozone 
members. As regards dissimilarity in export commodity structure, there is a greater variety within 
the Eurozone countries in comparison with the CEECs’ exports to the Eurozone. So, the CEECs 
reveal their comparative advantage in export sectors typical for the euro area. Next, most of the 
CEECs, except perhaps Poland and Romania, are highly open. On the other hand, the degree of 
financial intermediation is generally much weaker as compared to the Eurozone (before its 
creation). It is important to note that the results for the Eurozone presented in Table 3 are based on 
averaging over bilateral relations between countries. If we use weights (1998 GDP in our case), 
the results for the Eurozone are more favorable in terms of their OCA conditions. Bilateral trade 
links within the euro area countries increase considerably. The commodity structure of bilateral 
exports within the euro area is less diversified as compared to no GDP weighting. While the 
results for openness remain largely the same, financial intermediation is much stronger. Another 
point here is that while the OCA conditions are favorable for most CEECs, they remain quite 
                                                           
14 We also examined other variables from equation (1), in particular the size of the economy. The results are 
largely unchanged and, for the sake of space, we do not present them.  
15 The data on dissimilarity of export commodity structure end in 2002, as we were unable to obtain more recent 
figures. Also, for some countries the data were not available on a quarterly basis. Nevertheless, the commodity 
structure of exports generally tends to be quite stable over time (see Figure 4 in the Appendix). It is also 
important to note that this variable is calculated vis-à-vis Germany, as figures for the euro area as a whole simply 
do not exist. 12   Roman Horváth  
 
stable over the long term and do not change abruptly (see Figure 3-6 in Appendix), although the 
pattern of shocks may change after joining the Eurozone.  
Figure 1: Actual and Predicted Exchange Rate Volatility: Comparison of CEECs and the 
Eurozone 
 
Note: The predictions are based on Table 1, column 1. 
 
The next step is to compare the actual and predicted exchange rate variability between the euro 
area countries and the CEECs (vis-à-vis the euro for the CEECs). The results in Figure 1 clearly 
suggest that while actual exchange rate variability is larger in the CEECs than it used to be in the 
euro area before its creation, the predicted exchange rate variability is roughly at Eurozone levels. 
The obvious discrepancy in terms of the degree of exchange rate volatility between the euro area 
countries and the CEECs arises from the fact that while several CEECs maintain flexible 
exchange rates, all the euro area countries participated in the ERM in the sample period and thus 
bounded their exchange rate fluctuations. This discrepancy disappears in the case of exchange rate 
pressures, as shown below. It is also worth noting that Latvia and Lithuania exhibit relatively 
large exchange rate volatility despite the fact that these countries maintained currency board 
arrangements throughout the sample period. This is because neither country anchored its currency 
vis-à-vis the euro at any time during the sample period.  
 
 Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area Criteria   13 
 
Table 5: Actual and Predicted Exchange Rate Volatility: the CEECs, 1999–2004 
  Exchange Rate Variability 
  Actual Predicted 
Bulgaria 0.014  0.015 
Czech Republic  0.026  0.001 
Estonia 0.005  -0.002 
Hungary 0.037  0.001 
Latvia 0.036  0.030 
Lithuania 0.036  0.017 
Poland 0.063  0.016 
Romania 0.051  0.015 
Slovakia 0.030  -0.001 
Slovenia 0.010  0.004 
Note: The predictions are based on Table 1, column 1. 
 
The results for the individual CEECs are also presented in Table 5. Clearly, countries maintaining 
a currency board, such as Estonia or Bulgaria, experience the smallest exchange rate variability. 
The Polish zloty and Romanian leu are particularly volatile in the sample period. The predicted 
exchange rate variability is generally at the Eurozone level; however, there is also heterogeneity 
within the CEECs. We find that the predicted variability is topped by Estonia and the Visegrad 
countries (except Poland). Surprisingly, we find Lithuania and Latvia at the bottom. A study in a 
similar vein by Boreiko (2003), while using different methodology (a fuzzy cluster algorithm), 
identifies the same group of CEECs as being most aligned with the euro area. The only exception 
here is Latvia.
16 
Next, we examine the exchange rate pressures for the CEECs. The results in Figure 2 suggest that 
the CEECs experience exchange rate pressures at the level typical for the euro area countries. 
Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have the smallest predicted pressures among 
the CEECs. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the actual pressures for Slovakia and 
Hungary are much greater than those implied by our model. Unfortunately, our analysis does not 
allow for an explanation of the underlying reasons for this difference. It may be due to several 
factors, such as credibility of economic policies, rigidity of labor markets, or speculative attacks 
(for example, the speculative attack on the Hungarian forint in January 2003). Alternatively, the 
difference between the actual and predicted pressures might be interpreted as “excessive non-
fundamental volatility”. According to Mundell (1973), this non-fundamental volatility vanishes 
after joining the monetary union. In such case, the countries for which the difference between the 
actual and predicted pressures is large would, in comparison with other countries, benefit the most 
from adopting the euro. 
 
                                                           
16 Boreiko (2003) also examines the nominal convergence of the CEECs and the group of best performers, then 
narrows down to Estonia and Slovenia.  14   Roman Horváth  
 
Figure 2: Actual and Predicted Exchange Rate Pressures: Comparison of CEECs and the 
Eurozone 
 
Note: The results are based on Table 2, column 2.  
 
We present detailed results for the actual and predicted exchange rate pressures in Table 7. 
Interestingly, among the CEECs the pressures seem to be lowest in Estonia and the Czech 
Republic. On the other hand, Slovakia and Romania experienced quite large pressures in 1999–
2004. The predicted pressures are largely correlated with the actual ones. We predict that Estonia 
should experience the smallest exchange rate pressures in this region, while Poland may face 
pressures three times larger than Estonia.  
 
Table 7: Actual and Predicted Exchange Rate Pressures: the CEECs, 1999–2004 
  Exchange Rate Pressures 
  Actual Predicted 
Bulgaria 4.70  4.27 
Czech Republic  2.37  2.84 
Estonia 1.84  1.68 
Hungary 4.82  2.60 
Latvia 3.93  4.86 
Lithuania 4.81  4.46 
Poland 6.57  6.10 
Romania 11.83  5.42 
Slovakia 8.83  2.00 
Slovenia   4.94  3.86 
Note: The results are based on Table 2, column 2.  Exchange Rate Variability, Pressures and Optimum Currency Area Criteria   15 
 
Overall, the results suggest that most of the CEECs fulfill the necessary condition for joining the 
monetary union, i.e., they are relatively well aligned with the euro area. Nevertheless, it would be 
hasty to advise them to join the euro area as soon as possible, even if one believes that they may 
benefit from a large currency union in the long term (as the OCA conditions suggest).
17 This is 
because it is necessary to consider a number of additional economic policy issues (e.g. nominal 
convergence) over the medium term to ensure smooth adoption of the common currency.  
6. Conclusions 
In this article we study the determinants of bilateral exchange rate variability and exchange rate 
pressures. The results are as follows. We find that the variables indicated by the optimum 
currency area theory explain the dynamics of exchange rates and exchange rate pressures to a 
large extent. There is also some evidence that more open economies fear floating. Greater 
variability of the US dollar increases exchange rate variability, but not exchange rate pressures. 
The results also do not support any significant difference between the EU core and EU periphery. 
European economies bilaterally face both weaker exchange rate variability and weaker exchange 
rate pressures as compared to other developed countries. 
Next, we also predict exchange rate variability and pressures for the CEECs. The results suggest 
some heterogeneity among the CEECs in terms of their exchange rate volatility and pressures. 
Notably, Estonia experiences both low variability and low pressures. Overall, however, our model 
implies that the current levels of exchange rate variability and pressures are at the same level as 
the euro area countries before they adopted the euro. This is because the CEECs seem to be 
relatively well aligned with the euro area countries, especially in terms of their trade integration, 
openness and similar export commodity structure.  
                                                           
17 This statement is conditional on the extent to which the euro area forms an OCA. Obviously, this is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 16   Roman Horváth  
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Appendix 1 Measurement of Explanatory Variables 
 
This appendix lists the formal derivation of all the explanatory variables.  
 
Business cycle synchronization: 
( ) jt it ij y y SD BCS ∆ − ∆ = , where SD denotes sample standard deviation,  i y ∆  stands for the year-
on-year real GDP growth of country i (analogously for country j), and t represents time. 
 
Dissimilarity of export commodity structure: 
() () ( ) () ( ) () [] ∑
=
− + − + − =
T
t





, where ABS  denotes 
the absolute value,  it A  is the share of agricultural trade in total merchandise trade of country i at 
time t,  it B  is the share of mineral trade in total merchandise trade of country i at time t, and  it C  is 
the share of manufacturing trade in total merchandise trade of country i at time t (analogously for 


























, where  ijt ex  is the volume of exports at current prices from 
country i to country j at time t, and  it y  is GDP at current prices for country i at time t 














, where  it y  is GDP in USD for country i at time t (analogously 




























, where  it ex  and  ti im  are exports and imports of 
country i, and  it y  is i-th country GDP at time t, all at current prices (analogously for country j).  
 


























, where  it M2  is monetary aggregate M2 in country i at time t, and 
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∆ + ∆ = ψ . SD denotes 
sample standard deviation,  it e  represents the exchange rate of country i against the USD, and ∆ is 












π π , where  it π  is year-on-year CPI inflation in country i at time t 
(analogously for country j).  
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Appendix 2 – Additional Results 























of exports  1.00                     
Variability 
of USD  0.03  1.00                   
ERM 
dummy  -0.22 0.26  1.00                
EU core 
dummy -0.11  -0.08  0.09  1.00             
Financial 
development  0.47  0.01  -0.28  -0.08 1.00            
Europe 
dummy  -0.32 0.31  0.75  0.21  -0.37  1.00          
Openness -0.04 0.07  0.34 0.29  -0.05  0.43  1.00       
Exchange 
Rate 
Variability  0.30  0.01  -0.63 -0.23  0.24  -0.83  -0.48 1.00      
Variability 
of output  0.20 0.23  -0.04  -0.27  -0.05 -0.00 0.02 0.15  1.00    
Size of 
economy  -0.22 -0.39  -0.14 -0.03  -0.35 -0.27 -0.60 0.19 -0.31 1.00  
Trade links  -0.17 -0.22  0.29  0.11  -0.14 0.28 0.13 -0.46  -0.12  0.23  1.00
Inflation 
differential  -0.03 0.04  0.19  -0.08 -0.04 0.14  -0.09 -0.12 0.17 0.17 0.21
Note: Correlation coefficients significant at 5% level in bold. Data for developed countries only. 
 
Table 9: Correlation Matrix of Endogenous Variables and Instruments 
  Adjacency Distance  Dist.-sqr. Language  USA  WTO 
Adjacency  1.00       
Distance  -0.46  1.00      
Distance - squared  -0.42 1.00 1.00     
Common language  0.28  -0.07 -0.05 1.00     
USA dummy  -0.06  0.25 0.25 0.11 1.00   
WTO  0.20 -0.65 -0.66 -0.12  -0.26  1.00 
USD variability  -0.02  -0.14 -0.14 -0.23 -0.84 0.23 
Openness  0.04  -0.43 -0.42 0.11  -0.32 0.33 
Trade links  0.54 -0.47 -0.45 0.35 0.12  0.37 
Var. of output  -0.19 0.14 0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.02 
Inflation differential  0.15  -0.12 -0.12 -0.07 -0.13 0.16 
Note: Correlation coefficients significant at 5% level in bold. Data for developed countries only. 
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 Mean  0.11 6.06  0.03  0.02 64.77  0.45 
 Median  0.06 5.97  0.03  0.02 61.15  0.00 
 Maximum  1.20 8.70  0.07  0.04  134.06  1.00 
 Minimum  0.00 4.08  0.01  0.00 20.42  0.00 
 Std. Dev.  0.15 0.91  0.02  0.01 21.03  0.50 
 Skewness  3.66 0.34  0.37 -0.17 0.62  0.21 
 Kurtosis  20.56 2.64  1.84  2.10  3.00  1.04 
           
 Jarque-Bera  2866.12 4.63  14.97  7.34  12.25  31.68 
 Probability  0.00 0.10  0.00  0.03 0.00  0.00 
 Observations  190 190  190  190 190  190 
Note: Data for developed countries only. 
 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 















Mean 887605.30  0.05  0.41  0.09  2.31  0.41  0.05 
Median 2.44  0.00  0.00  0.09  1.67  0.25 0.06 
Maximum 8875957.00 1.00  1.00  0.15  8.72  1.94  0.11 
Minimum 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.45  0.03  0.00 
Std. Dev.  2669651.00  0.22  0.49  0.04  1.78  0.41  0.02 
Skewness 2.67 4.01  0.36  -1.26  1.98  1.82  0.14 
Kurtosis  8.11 17.06  1.13  4.55 6.12  5.78  2.54 
              
Jarque-Bera 432.00 2072.43  31.81  69.28  200.9  165.45  8.14 
Probability 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.08 
Observations 190  190  190  190  190  190  153 
Note: Data for developed countries only. 
 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics on Instruments 
  Adjacency Distance Distance-squared Language WTO  USA 
 Mean  0.11  7.56  58.55  0.15  0.43  0.10 
 Median  0.00  7.25  52.58  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Maximum  1.00  9.42  88.68  1.00  1.00  1.00 
 Minimum  0.00  4.92  24.22  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Std. Dev.  0.31  1.20  18.18  0.36  0.50  0.30 
 Skewness  2.48  -0.01  0.16  1.99  0.28  2.67 
 Kurtosis  7.17  1.75  1.68  4.96  1.08  8.11 
            
 Jarque-Bera  333.23  12.29  14.60  155.72  31.71  432.00 
 Probability  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Observations  190  190  190  190  190  190 
Note: Data for developed countries only. 
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Table 13: Relevance of Instrumental Variables: Shea’s Partial R-squared 
  TRADE BCS  OPEN  INFL  DOLVAR 
Specification 1  0.64  0.23  0.55  0.20  --- 
Specification 2  0.68  0.18  ---  0.23  --- 
Specification 3   0.53  0.15  ---  0.15  0.77 
Specification 4  0.52  0.12  0.29  0.15  0.77 
Note: For abbreviations, see Appendix 1. Following Shea (1997), the test is implemented as follows: I 
regress each endogenous regressor,  X , on the set of instruments. I save the fitted values,
∧
X . 
Next, I regress one of the endogenous regressors, 1 X , on the remaining regressors and save the 
residuals, 1
~
X . Next, I regress 1
~
X on the remaining 
~
X  and save  1
−
X . Finally, I compute the 
sample squared correlation between  1
~
X  and  1
−
X .  
Specification 1: Explanatory variables: TRADE, BCS, INFLATION, OPEN, DISSIM, FIN. 
Specification 2: Explanatory variables: TRADE, BCS, INFLATION, SIZE, DISSIM, FIN. 
Specification 3: Explanatory variables: TRADE, BCS, INFLATION, OPEN, DISSIM, FIN, 
DOLVAR, EUROPE, EUCORE. 
Specification 4: Explanatory variables: TRADE, BCS, INFLATION, SIZE, DISSIM, FIN, 
DOLVAR, EUROPE, EUCORE. 
Endogenous variables: TRADE, BCS, INFLATION, OPEN, DOLVAR . 
The instrument list is the same for all four specifications: log (distance) and its square, regional 
trade agreement dummy, common language dummy, common border dummy, size of economies 
and USA dummy. 
It is worth noting that as the dependent variable is irrelevant for the results of Shea test, it is 
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Note: Openness, as is shown in Figures, is measured by the average of given CEEC and Eurozone 
openness. A country’s openness is estimated as the sum of exports and imports over GDP. 
Eurozone openness is an average of its member states openness. See Appendix 1 for details.  
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Note: Trade links assess the degree of trade integration of a given country with Euro area countries. 
See Appendix 1 for details.  
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Note: Dissimilarity on the level of SITC – 10. See Appendix 1 for details.  
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